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Usable security assumes that when security functions are more usable, people are more likely to use 
them, leading to an improvement in overall security. Existing software design and engineering processes 
provide little guidance for leveraging this in the development of applications. Three case studies explore 
organizational attempts to provide usable security products.
S ecurity products are designed to keep individual and corporate users’ systems safe from threats, 
but such products are effective only if employees and 
customers are able and willing to use them—and use 
them properly. When asked about involving usability 
experts in their work, software project managers often 
explained why they didn’t find such experts useful. One 
manager said, “I would rather hire a Wiccan, because 
at least they have a spell book.” Security developers are 
finally realizing through experience and data that many 
users ignore or circumvent unusable security products. 
Prompted by lost sales, lost time, and a profusion of 
misuse errors, developers want to build usable security 
into their projects. The July 2009 National Academy 
of Sciences Workshop identified several challenges to 
advancing research in usability, security, and privacy, 
including inconsistent terminology and definitions; 
limited access to data; scarcity of expertise; unfamiliar-
ity with work at the intersection of usability, security, 
and privacy; and difficulty of moving security usability 
research results into practice.1 
To date, many developers claim to have thoughtfully 
integrated user-centered design into their processes to 
reach a usable security goal. However, usable security 
involves much more than interfaces. It addresses how 
people think about and use their computer systems, 
particularly in the context of how they do their jobs. 
Good usable security accounts for differences in user 
experience, needs, skills, and attitudes as well as chang-
ing tasks and business needs. In addition, successful 
developers will need to build usable security into pro-
cesses spanning the system’s life cycle, from conception 
through design, implementation, and evolution, rather 
than addressing only a single user at one point in the 
software development process. 
A rich body of behavioral science results can be mined 
to improve the likelihood of successful usable security. 
Two of the authors of this article, Shari Lawrence Pfleeger 
and Deanna D. Caputo, have mapped out several promis-
ing areas where behavioral science results could be applied 
to significantly improve usable security, including under-
standing heuristics, biases, framing, and cognitive load.2 
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Other researchers point to studies of human–computer 
interaction that can form a basis for improving usability.3
This article describes the findings of three case stud-
ies, each of which explores a unique organization’s 
attempts to improve the usability of its security products. 
Usable Security Needs a Different 
Approach
In August 2011, the Institute for Information Infra-
structure Protection (I3P) convened a National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-sponsored 
workshop to encourage practitioners to take the next 
step in advancing research in usable security: integrat-
ing actions promoting usable security in all stages of 
the software development life cycle.4 Participants in 
the Software and Usable Security Aligned for Good 
Engineering (SAUSAGE) Workshop observed that 
the intersection of usability and security is problematic 
because making software robustly secure often entails 
controlling or limiting user actions in ways that reduce 
perceived usability (and perhaps utility and adoption 
of the software). This has led to an unproven yet persis-
tent belief on the part of some developers that there is 
a tradeoff between usability and security, which makes 
usable security unachievable if true. Therefore, one of 
the workshop’s recommendations was to conduct a 
series of case studies to investigate how organizations 
deliver usable security and how they evaluate the effects 
of changes they implement. As a consequence, NIST 
and the US Department of Homeland Security funded 
a multidisciplinary team of researchers to develop a uni-
form case study methodology and apply it to three dif-
ferent organizations. This article describes the results of 
this two-year project to understand what leads to or hin-
ders the development of usable security.
Although some developers know—from experience 
or published research—that most users ignore or cir-
cumvent unusable security products, others still erro-
neously think there’s a tradeoff between usability and 
security and that users should make extra efforts to be 
secure. For example, Adam Beautement and colleagues 
found that users will ignore or circumvent security that 
takes too much time and effort and therefore under-
mines productivity.5 Unfortunately, existing software 
design and engineering processes provide little guidance 
for leveraging usability and security in the development 
of next-generation end-user applications—neither do 
they suggest how to make existing security products 
and services more usable in cost-effective ways. All soft-
ware engineering processes should address human deci-
sion making and behavior, but system developers and 
designers are rarely taught how to improve system char-
acteristics while maintaining decision-making effective-
ness. To address these gaps, this research focused on 
developing case studies of usable security design and 
implementation that could be used both in understand-
ing the problems and in informing organizations about 
solutions. In particular, these case studies investigated 
how to incorporate usability and security in software 
engineering processes. 
The case studies were based on a series of inter-
views with key developers, designers, and managers. 
The interview questions drew on principles of activity 
theory,6,7 which support identification of the organiza-
tional drivers and constraints that shape team behav-
ior and influence design and development processes. 
Activity theory, coupled with questions about human–
computer interaction, ensures that broader contextual 
drivers are accounted for in both the design and evalua-
tion of technological products. It’s valuable in directing 
researcher attention beyond individual cognitive tasks 
to identify and assess how contextual factors, such as 
organizational structure, the build environment, project 
funding, and reward systems, influence team and indi-
vidual approaches to task accomplishment. 
Consequently, the research team looked at organiza-
tional factors in software development and deployment 
that could affect activities intended to integrate usable 
security into software development. For example, how a 
software development team perceives or relates to end 
users is likely to influence how it balances and imple-
ments usability and security in its software designs. In 
many large organizations, software teams work at a sig-
nificant distance from the real-world end users of their 
products. Other times, software functions are developed 
in response to development requests from customers 
who aren’t end users and who might be poorly informed 
about what end users actually do, resulting in software 
that fails to meet the usability needs of real end users.
For this study, usable security is motivated by the 
assumption that when security functions are more 
usable, users will be more likely to use them, leading to an 
improvement in overall security. In this work, the research 
team adopted the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) definition of usability: “The extent to 
which a product can be used by specified users to achieve 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a 
specific context of use.”8 Based on this definition, the team 
defined usable security as “delivering the required levels of 
security and also user effectiveness, efficiency, and satis-
faction.” Recognizing the importance of performing rigor-
ous case studies and drawing on solid behavioral science, 
this multidisciplinary research team brought together 
computer, social, and behavioral scientists from three dif-
ferent institutions with expertise in software engineer-
ing, including software security, testing, process, design, 
and usability, as well as experience in applying social and 
behavioral science methods to security.
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These three case studies are intended to form the 
basis of a growing corpus of studies that will help the 
security and usability communities understand how to 
make security products more usable. Indeed, it is hoped 
that eventually the lack of usability will no longer be an 
excuse for users to circumvent security software, sys-
tems, or procedures. 
Methodology
Any credible investigation into what makes security 
more usable must necessarily involve an understand-
ing of the users, their motivations, and their tasks. As 
David Alan Grier noted, “We can’t understand our cur-
rent state of affairs without knowing the way we thought 
and acted in the past any more than we can fully under-
stand a neighborhood without remembering the forces 
that shaped it.”9 To explore the environment in which 
usable security is embedded, we employed behavioral 
science techniques that explore context and motivation. 
In particular, the intent was to document the organi-
zational efforts and expertise involved in developing a 
security product that has been constructed or enhanced 
to make it more usable. Because the goal was to identify 
factors that lead to success, the case study methodology 
involved three things: stating tentative hypotheses, eval-
uating the degree of control over variables, and taking 
steps to ensure the meaningfulness of the investigation. 
Michael Agar noted, “In its classic form, a hypoth-
esis is a statement of the co-variation between two vari-
ables. … On the other hand, hypothesis has a broader 
sense as ‘an idea to check out.’ … Something learned in 
a conversation becomes a hypothesis to check in fur-
ther conversations or observations.”10 Unlike experi-
ments, in which sampling and control over all variables 
drive the research design, it’s not appropriate in this 
type of exploratory research to expect every variable to 
have precise theoretical and operational definitions. An 
initial definition may be the starting point for discus-
sion of a concept, but researchers might find that some 
people use the same language with very different mean-
ings. Thus, this usable security case study methodology 
blends several approaches drawn from psychological 
and anthropological case study techniques so that sys-
tematization and study design, combined with careful 
elicitation of data from appropriate sources, can ensure 
that the evidence supporting the hypotheses is credible. 
In this way, as the corpus of usable security case studies 
expands, findings from individual cases can be explored 
and tested in other environments, leading to a broad 
understanding of how, when, and under which condi-
tions to provide usable security.
The three organizations studied were selected 
to help explain three things: why each organization 
added usability and security elements to its software 
development process, how and where they added them, 
and how the organization determined that the resulting 
software was usable and secure. For each organization, 
we sought findings that could be supported by argu-
ments that support or refute hypothesized theories. 
Initially, the research team hypothesized three possible 
explanations of why changes in the software develop-
ment process might lead to more usable security:
 ■ The “key individual” theory: Improved outcomes 
resulted not from the process changes but instead 
from the efforts of a single individual who cares about 
usable security.
 ■ The “experienced team” theory: Improved outcomes 
resulted not from the process changes but instead 
from the team’s prior experience in building usable 
security.
 ■ The “incentives” theory: Improved outcomes resulted 
not from the process changes but from incentives 
placed on team performance with respect to usable 
security.
To ensure the meaningfulness of the investigation 
at multiple levels, we developed a set of interview ques-
tions for each of three units of analysis levels: developer, 
product manager, and senior manager. The final inter-
view protocol can be found in the “Interview Questions 
for Case Studies” sidebar. To verify that the investiga-
tion was meaningful and confirm anticipated control 
over variables before carrying out the reported case 
studies, the team first performed a pilot study of the 
full protocol. This test of the questions, ordering, and 
interactions not only helped us understand and practice 
the steps but also demonstrated that the original sets of 
questions were too long and repetitive. The questions 
in the sidebar represent the revised questions, updated 
after the pilot test. 
Once the case study methodology and interview 
questions were piloted and well documented, the 
team obtained approval of the study design from each 
research organization’s Human Subjects Review Com-
mittee to ensure that sensitive data was adequately 
protected. The research team took many measures to 
protect the volunteering organizations’ intellectual 
property and reputations. These measures included 
having both subjects and research team members sign 
nondisclosure agreements, anonymizing the orga-
nization names, encrypting all documents, avoiding 
cloud services where control over documents could 
be lost, and limiting or shredding all paper docu-
ments, such as notes or printouts. A more complete 
discussion of the usable security case study method-
ology developed during this research program can be 
found elsewhere.11
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Participating Organizations 
We identified three providers of cybersecurity systems 
willing to participate in our case studies. Each organi-
zation agreed to provide access to documentation of 
its perceived need for usable security, the steps taken 
to build usable security into its development pro-
cess, and data useful in evaluating the effects of using 
the enhanced development process. Before the inter-
views, the research team made sure that the organiza-
tions understood the steps of the research process. In 
particular, we asked about how problems and oppor-
tunities were recognized and addressed, and how the 
corrections or enhancements were evaluated. In return 
for their time and sharing, the organizations received a 
confidential, informal, outside, usable security evalua-
tion by the senior research team of computer scientists, 
psychologists, and an anthropologist. This evaluation 
included a description of skills, processes used, gaps 
in team composition (such as usability expertise), and 
lessons learned during the development cycle that 
Interview Questions for Case Studies
These questions were asked of participants at three levels of 
inquiry that correspond to the three levels of analysis: software 
development, product management, and higher management. 
Within each level, we asked questions about security, usability, and 
software development.
Section 1: Development Level
Please give us an overview of the product that we are discussing 
today. Is this a new or legacy product? If possible, as part of your 
overview, can we see a demo?
Security
1. Did the specifications you were given cover security aspects? 
For instance, was a risk/threat analysis provided? Were security 
mechanisms specified? What were the security challenges in 
the project?
2. Were you given any specific security criteria to meet? (When 
would the software be “secure enough”?)
3. Who were security tasks assigned to? Did a team member have 
the role of “security champion”? If decisions were made, can 
you walk us through the process?
4. Did you use any security design methods and tools? (Example: 
misuse case analysis.)
5. Were any security assessments carried out during the project? 
(Examples: code walkthrough, pen testing.) If so, what were the 
results? What changes did you make in response?
6. Did you consult other team members, or other security 
resources in the company, at any stage? If so, what was your 
question, and what insights/help did you obtain?
7. Did you consult any external security resources—security 
guidelines, CERT pages, threat analyses provided by consul-
tants—at any point? If so, did the resources help you to answer 
the question? 
Usability
1. Did the specification you were given cover usability aspects? 
For instance, was the UI design provided? What were the us-
ability challenges in the project?
2. Were you given any specific usability criteria to meet? (When 
would the software be “usable enough”?)
3. Who were usability tasks assigned to? Did a team member have 
the role of “usability champion”? If decisions were made, can 
you walk us through the process?
4. Did you use any usability methods and tools? (Examples: task 
analysis, prototyping.) 
5. Were any usability assessments carried out during the proj-
ect? (Examples: heuristic evaluation, user testing.) If so, what 
were the results? Did you make any changes in response to 
the findings?
6. Did you consult other team members, or other usability 
resources in the company, at any stage? If so, what was your 
question, and what insights/help did you obtain?
7. Did you consult any external usability resources—literature, 
design guidelines—at any point? If so, what was your question? 
Did the resources help you to answer the question?
Software Development
1. Did you follow a particular software development process on 
this project? If so, how did it diverge from the official process?
2. Who produced the usability and security requirements for the 
project?
3. Did you encounter conflicting usability and security require-
ments in this project? If so, what were the choices? Can you 
walk us through your decision process?
4. Did the software development process support the decision? If 
yes, how? If not, why not?
5. Did you consult any internal or external resources—colleagues, 
developer forum—to help you solve the problem? If so, what 
information was helpful to you?
6. How did you conduct the testing during the software devel-
opment process? What were the results? Did you test your 
security mechanisms for usability?
7. Did you perform an evaluation of usability and/or security of 
Continued on page XX
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produced the more usable software. These documents 
could be used by the organizations to raise awareness 
internally about good practices, teach other software 
developers how to adopt them, and identify areas of 
skill or process that are ripe for further improvement. 
The interviews and discussions provided both manag-
ers and practitioners with an opportunity to reflect on 
and document their activities and outcomes—actions 
often not taken when staff members are busy. 
The three case study organizations had several com-
monalities. All three are large companies (between 
14,000 and 300,000 employees), and all use a large 
number of applications and products (some home-
grown, others purchased). All three companies have 
more than one business location. 
The organizations also had significant differences. 
The three companies have very different customers, 
including federal and private. More important, they pri-
oritize security and usability very differently. The orga-
nizations ranged from a “security first” corporate culture 
with a low tolerance for deliberate security violations to 
one in which security isn’t typically the initial focus of 
your project? If so, how did you conduct the evaluation? Did 
you contact actual users?
8. In the software development process, when was usable security 
considered and implemented? (Examples: at the same time as 
other regular features, or after everything is done.)
9. How were usability and security handled during mainte-
nance activities?
10. What percentage of the total project effort was spent on us-
able security?
Section 2: Product Level 
Please give us an overview of the product that we are discussing 
today. If possible, as part of your overview, can we see a demo?
Security
1. What were the specific security goals/requirements for this 
project?
2. Why were they important, and for whom? (Example: reputa-
tion of customer organization.)
3. Who identified the security goals, and how?
4. Were specific criteria for meeting security goals identified 
(when the software would be “secure enough”)?
Usability
1. What were the specific usability goals/requirements for this 
project?
2. Why were they important, and for whom? (Example: produc-
tivity of employees in customer organization.)
3. Who identified these usability goals, and how?
4. Were specific criteria for meeting usability goals identified 
(when the software would be “usable enough”)?
Software Development
1. Were there specific goals for usability of the security mecha-
nisms in the software? 
2. Why were they important, and for whom? (Example: so cus-
tomer organization would retain its own customers.)
3. Did you contact actual users?
4. Who identified the specific goals, and how?
5. What percentage of the total project effort was spent on us-
able security?
6. Did you test your security mechanisms for usability?
Level 3: Higher Management Level
Please give us an overview of the product that we are discussing 
today. If possible, as part of your overview, can we see a demo?
Security
1. What were the specific security goals/requirements for this 
project? 
2. Why were they important, and for whom? (Example: reputa-
tion of customer organization.)
3. Who identified the security goals, and how?
4. Were specific criteria for meeting security goals identified 
(when the software would be “secure enough”)?
Usability
1. What were the specific usability goals/requirements for this 
project? 
2. Why were they important, and for whom? (Example: produc-
tivity of employees in customer organization.)
3. Who identified these usability goals, and how?
4. Were specific criteria for meeting usability goals identified 
(when the software would be “usable enough”)?
Software Development
1. Were there specific goals for usability of the security mecha-
nisms in the software? 
2. Why were they important, and for whom? (Example: so cus-
tomer organization would retain its own customers.)
3. Did you contact future users?
4. Who identified the specific goals, and how?
5. What percentage of the total project effort was spent on us-
able security?
6. Did you test your security mechanisms for usability?
Continued from page XX
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each business unit; in the latter, a drop in product sales 
drove a focus on usability. 
Data Collection and Analysis
The research team made a two-day visit to each orga-
nization’s site to learn both why and how the security 
was designed to be usable and how the product’s secu-
rity and usability were evaluated. We questioned rep-
resentative software developers, product managers, 
and senior managers using interviews, so that no staff 
member’s work was interrupted for more than an hour 
or two. Some staff members were asked follow-up ques-
tions by email or telephone. An important part of the 
case study methodology is the fact that we intentionally 
didn’t define usability or security for the interviewees 
so that we could get a sense of how they perceived those 
characteristics. Instead, we asked them to provide cri-
teria for successful security and usability. In addition, 
their responses to interview questions revealed their 
working definitions and assumptions, especially con-
cerning usability. 
At least three team members took detailed notes at 
each interview. Each team member read every set of 
notes, highlighted the important statements, identi-
fied key actors and processes, and resolved differences 
among datasets for each interviewee. Then, the rec-
onciled notes were qualitatively coded independently 
by three team members and analyzed, using Atlas.ti 
software, to assist in identifying relationships across 
concepts and interviews. Qualitative coding is a method-
ology in the behavioral sciences that refers to the pro-
cess of reading text and then assigning labels to words 
and phrases to classify concepts and assign meaning. 
Coding had least two steps: assigning initial labels to 
text, and then reviewing the codes to focus the descrip-
tors and extract meaning. For example, the second, 
more focused step might eliminate some codes, com-
bine others into categories, and identify links or themes 
that connect some codes to others. The goal is to dis-
cover relationships that wouldn’t likely be found simply 
by reading the text. 
Then, one organization at a time, we used the cod-
ing results for each organization to evaluate key factors 
contributing to some aspect of usable security. We sent 
findings to each organization separately, so that its rep-
resentatives could correct any errors in understanding, 
transcription, attribution, or fact. Because of the sen-
sitivity of these individual organizational findings, we 
don’t discuss them individually in detail. Rather, analysis 
focuses on the data across organizations to identify pat-
terns that improve usable security or inhibit its success.
Cross-Case Findings
Although each case study is designed to be pursued on 
its own, the research team created a consistent method-
ology to enable multiple-case study analysis. A multi-
ple-case comparison not only strengthens results when 
commonalities are identified but can also suggest new 
hypotheses based on variation in context and results. 
Across cases, the focus was on why and how case results 
differed or were the same.
The three organizations agreed to participate in the 
case studies because, at some point in their business 
processes, each not only recognized the importance of 
usable security but also made changes to try to improve 
its security products’ usability. The analysis revealed 
additional important commonalities:
 ■ each had small development teams, even though all 
three were large companies;
 ■ each focused mainly on making the remote access 
process or the access review and revocation process 
more usable;
 ■ each had an agile-inspired, informal development pro-
cess, in which developers followed the spirit though 
not necessarily the letter of a particular agile process;
 ■ the staff in each organization had different ideas about 
what usability is; and
 ■ the staff in each organization had different ideas about 
the relationship between usability and security.
None of the organizations had defined criteria or 
measurements for usability or security. They didn’t 
perform formal usability testing, so the teams couldn’t 
assess if usability really improved for the users they 
were specifically targeting. Similarly, there was little or 
no formal security evaluation, so the teams also couldn’t 
assess if better usability improved security. Most inter-
viewees stated that they intended to conduct security 
evaluations (and some actually thought they had) but 
were unable to articulate any such process when asked. 
In addition, no organization used business modeling to 
determine if investment in usable security would pay 
off, and in what ways. But even without this key infor-
mation, several important conclusions can be drawn.
Pleasure versus Pain
Each organization responded more to pain than to plea-
sure; that is, in each organization, usability was mostly 
a “grudge sale,” in which managers responded more to 
financial pressures—reduced sales, increased competi-
tion, or escalating cost of use—than to reasoned argu-
ments about the need for usability. The pain was usually 
evidenced by user complaints (internal or external) 
from large numbers of customers or from influential 
individuals, such as corporate executive officers who 
couldn’t use an application. Most often, usable security 
was seen as an optional cost, not as an opportunity or 
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a competitive advantage. As one interviewee summa-
rized, “Usability groups are available to anyone who has 
money to support them. We usually pass on the costs 
to our customers. We let the customers decide whether 
usability is important enough to pay for.”
Economics and Incentives
None of the case study organizations were motivated 
simply by providing usable security as a dimension of 
quality and as the right thing to do in building a system. 
Instead, based on the research team’s observations, eco-
nomics and incentives were the key factors that initiated 
a push for usable security. Because those who deliver 
secure applications with poor usability generally don’t 
bear the resulting cost, complaints about unusable secu-
rity are relayed to developers and then often ignored. 
Moreover, additional budget isn’t allocated to devel-
opment for usability unless it affects the organization 
in a big way. Thus, addressing, measuring, and track-
ing these costs is necessary but very difficult. There’s 
little reward for usable security, and there are few con-
sequences for bad usability or failed attempts at usable 
security. In other words, developers simply don’t feel 
the pain inflicted by bad usability.
Differing Definitions
When asked what usability really means, respondents 
offered radically different definitions. Some equated 
usability with productivity: fewer keystrokes leading 
to lower cost, or novel features leading to business 
improvements. Some defined usability in terms of access 
for new users, devices, or platforms. Only a few indi-
viduals thought about usability as a way of increasing 
security: fewer user errors or increased willingness to 
comply with security rules. One interviewee described 
a seamless user experience in which security doesn’t 
get in the way: “Users need to get to the resources they 
need, and do what they want and when without think-
ing.” These differences in understanding mean that con-
sistent measurement of improvements in usability can 
be daunting, and there’s no one-size-fits-all metric to 
apply.
This diverse view of what usable security means 
was exacerbated by the dearth of developers who real-
ize that delivering usable security goes deeper than the 
interface. Developers interviewed rarely had any under-
standing of
 ■ general user characteristics, such as the capabilities 
and limitations of human perception and cognition;
 ■ their target users’ primary tasks and the associated 
performance constraints; or
 ■ the context of use (physical, social, and temporal) of 
security applications or processes.
Consequently, they had no idea how a particular security 
solution might affect an individual or an organization. 
Achieved Usability
Another finding is that usable security wasn’t always 
achieved. Without clear evaluation criteria or anything 
measurable, “usable security” was in the eye of each 
individual beholder. Even within the same organiza-
tion, different participants had different ideas of what 
this meant. 
Delivery
Even when they understood what usability might look 
like, developers didn’t always see a need to deliver it. In 
particular, developers didn’t understand the impact of 
lack of usability on individual performance and well-
being, organizational productivity, or the effectiveness 
of security. For example, one interviewee said, “This 
technology was built to address some of these diffi-
culties to solve existing problems without negatively 
changing the user experience. Hence, input from the 
actual users didn’t seem relevant.” The developers con-
fused user knowledge with their own in-depth knowl-
edge of the product, falsely assuming that user needs 
were the same as “how we [the developers] think it 
should be used.” Many also viewed usability knowledge 
and methods as “common sense” (which they naturally 
felt they possessed in abundance), not as a specialist dis-
cipline with relevant knowledge and methods. 
“Developer Knows Best”
Underlying the view of usability as common sense was 
the belief that “developers know best.” They considered 
themselves as users of the product in question, and thus 
saw little or no need to engage with target users. The fol-
lowing quotes capture this perfectly: “I can see a prob-
lem before the users see it; I can go in and troubleshoot. 
I use it myself,” and “A lot of our background comes 
from running around helping users out. That’s given us 
a good perspective of what users need and what their 
complaints will be. We kind of have a sense based on 
our experience.” Yet, all developers admitted that they 
were not taught usability in their computer science or 
security programs and didn’t have any on-the-job or 
work-sponsored training, either. Despite not knowing 
how a product might be used “in the wild,” develop-
ers believe they know a product well and know how to 
improve it. This gap in training and awareness leads the 
developers to focus on optimizing features they under-
stand while ignoring potentially important improve-
ments that could be guided by user feedback. This bias 
toward “developer knows best,” in addition to the belief 
that there is a tradeoff between usability and security, 
also means that many developers accept guidance only 
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from other developers. In particular, these developers 
don’t value recommendations from usability special-
ists, who are viewed as people who “cannot code,” and 
thus have no understanding of what would be required 
to deliver the designs they recommend. We found that 
these cultural differences were very real and common 
and created barriers to communication and delivery of 
usable security. 
Discussion 
The cross-case findings are fascinating in many ways, 
including the degree to which they reveal cultural biases 
hinted at in the original National Academies study. Dif-
ferences in jargon and concept were only a small part of 
the cultural divide; differences in training and thinking 
led to dismissal of impor-
tant user feedback.
Revisiting the 
three theories hypoth-
esized in the “Meth-
odology” section of 
this article, we found 
no support for theory 
1 (the key individual) 
or theory 2 (the experienced team). However, the case 
studies did find some support for the incentives theory: 
the companies were motivated to improve the usability 
of their security products only when it was clear that such 
improvement would decrease the negative consequences 
of the usability problems. To be specific, in one case the 
goal was to decrease calls to the help desk, which was 
staffed by the security team. In another case, the goal was 
to reduce the loss in market share that was due to a public 
negative report on the product’s usability. In the third, the 
goal was to reduce the institutional cost of thousands of 
employees wasting time with unusable systems. 
In other words, if usable security was important 
to the organization in terms of increased compliance 
with security policies or increased sales, then a way was 
found to make security more usable. Indeed, in one 
case, when the motivation was withdrawn, the organi-
zation reverted to less usable security. Please keep in 
mind that only three case studies have been completed 
to date, so significantly more data is necessary before 
these theories can be appropriately evaluated. 
Increasing Usable Security
Based on the findings, at least two options appear worth 
exploring to potentially increase usable security.
Assign responsibility for usable security to those who can 
deliver it. Currently, in most organizations, the IT help 
desk is the first place a user goes when experiencing sys-
tem problems. Thus, the help desk is taxed with the costs 
of poor usable security. The problems are measured 
in user complaints, and the help desk’s effectiveness is 
measured by how quickly it can remedy concerns, even 
when it can’t fix the problem. What if the number of 
user complaints was a metric affecting the performance 
reviews of the software’s designers or developers? Or, 
what if usable security was defined to include not only 
features but also lack of failures? Developers might then 
take increased ownership of failures in usable security 
and eventually take steps to design usable security into 
products during early development stages.
Provide training on usability and usable security—in 
school and on the job. Developers need a basic under-
standing of the complexity of human capabilities 
and limitations, as well 
as human activity 
and productivity, to 
appreciate the com-
plementary expertise 
offered by a usability 
expert. One devel-
oper familiar with 
usability said, “Focus 
groups are important. But I want to engage people and 
test it out because there will be ways in which they use 
it that are never thought of. …The moral of the story 
is that I’ve got experience and it doesn’t account for all 
the ways in which a user is going to use something that 
we haven’t anticipated.” Mutual respect between devel-
opers and usability experts might encourage the devel-
opers to see through different eyes and observe that 
unusable security isn’t secure because users will find 
workarounds to get their primary tasks done that will 
reduce intended security. 
Open Questions
In addition, our cross-case findings suggest several 
important open questions that need answers if usable 
security is to be respected and accepted by developers.
Is motivation more important than process? We began 
this study expecting to find places in the software devel-
opment process where usability knowledge and pro-
cesses could be best inserted. But what if a solution is 
not only about process, or even mainly about process? 
The role of process is to make sure people do what their 
organization wants, regardless of personal motivation. 
What we saw is that textbook or mandated software 
development processes weren’t followed routinely or 
even valued; their adoption occurred only when devel-
opers valued them and were personally motivated to 
use them. The three case study organizations were 
motivated by time or cost pressures, which caused them 
What if the number of user complaints was 
a metric affecting the performance reviews 
of the software’s designers or developers?
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to avoid usability processes. However, poor usability 
meant reduced access and thus reduced productivity for 
users. Poor usability led to inefficiencies, and one aspect 
of usability is efficient use of user time, especially when 
the task is secondary. A senior development team mem-
ber recognized that, consequently, poor usability meant 
sales were dropping. So, what is the role of motivation 
in encouraging consider-
ation of usable secu-
rity during system 
design, development, 
and sustainment and 
how do we determine 
what those motiva-
tions are? 
How do we overcome cultural barriers? The case studies 
identified and described barriers among development, 
security, and usability experts, but there are also barriers 
among different parts of a company that have different 
perceptions of the value of usable security. For example, 
developers might not value usable security, but sales 
and marketing staff could understand its value in dis-
tinguishing the product or service in the marketplace. 
Perhaps a shared lexicon about usability, productivity, 
security, and related concepts would reduce translation 
errors in communication among these experts. 
How do we encourage developers to value usability when 
they don’t bear the cost of not addressing usable security? 
Although organizations must clearly specify the usable 
security requirements, that isn’t enough. To develop-
ers, usability often is considered only after functionality 
and security. What if the value of usable security were 
monetized so that the cost of putting usability analysis 
into the process is weighed against the expense of the 
help desk support needed when products aren’t usable? 
In so doing, creating a business case for usable security 
might help. An organization can motivate developers by 
providing incentives or disincentives, or it can imple-
ment a process that ensures that usability is considered, 
regardless of whether people are motivated. If develop-
ers knew there was a formal usability evaluation, and 
products not meeting the usability threshold wouldn’t 
get released, they would very likely pay a lot more atten-
tion to the test criteria.
Does risk-based security make security more usable than 
compliance-based security? When reviewing the appro-
priateness of assigned system accesses, some manag-
ers focus their review only on those systems or data 
exhibiting the most operational, reputational, or finan-
cial risk. This attempt at efficiency replaces early, more 
straightforward approaches in which each manager is 
required to do a complete review of everyone’s access to 
everything. In other words, today’s organizations try to 
improve usability by framing security choices in terms of 
risk rather than compliance. The advantages go beyond 
reducing the size of the set needing scrutiny. Some 
organizational managers argued that risk-based security 
is more flexible and can more quickly handle changes 
to software development 
requirements. It’s not 
clear whether this 
risk-based approach 
actually improves 
security. What’s clear 
is that compliance 
increases: manag-
ers are most likely 
to complete the review if they have a smaller set of 
accesses to evaluate. What are some necessary and suf-
ficient actions that will increase security in a risk-based 
system? That is, how small can the size of the evaluated 
accesses be so that it encourages compliance, and how 
small is so small that it sacrifices security? 
Lessons Learned and a Call for More Case 
Studies
At the beginning of the project, we documented several 
hypotheses about usable security to visit after analysis 
and see what had been learned. Based on the data find-
ings, three of these hypotheses are false:
 ■ Usability is common sense; no experts needed.
 ■ If we make a product harder to use, then it’s more 
secure.
 ■ There’s always a tradeoff between usability and security.
However, the data collected leaves uncertainty about 
the truth or falsity of one hypothesis, which therefore 
needs further investigation: usable security is expensive. 
Measures of impact are needed to decide if this hypoth-
esis is true or false.
Some of these hypotheses might be true in some 
situations and false in others. Indeed, each of the three 
motivators for usable security posited at the beginning 
of our studies (key individual, experienced team, and 
incentives) could well be important to some extent in 
every organization. Although our three cases are too few 
for generalization, a larger corpus of case studies based 
on the same methodology is likely to suggest whether, 
when, and how these and other characteristics contrib-
ute to usable security.
Replicability
To perform the case studies, we purposely defined a 
methodology for three types of interviews that other 
Today’s organizations try to improve 
usability by framing security choices in 
terms of risk rather than compliance. 
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organizations can use at least to evaluate themselves, if 
not to enable other researchers to evaluate other orga-
nizations and compare the results with other studies in 
the corpus. Some clear lessons learned can be drawn 
from the creation, application, and evaluation of these 
three case studies that will be useful as other researchers 
apply the methodology to other organizations. 
Legal Concerns
In finding willing organizations to study, legal con-
cerns kept several organizations away. We approached 
a handful of organizations that had clearly been suc-
cessful in making their security applications more 
usable. At the development and product levels, staff 
members were eager to share their stories. But the 
organization’s legal staff was concerned that impor-
tant corporate intellectual property or secrets might 
be revealed, so permission to proceed wasn’t granted. 
The lesson? Make sure to talk to someone senior 
about the benefits of the research so he or she directs 
the lawyers to make it happen and manage the associ-
ated risks. 
Costs
In finding willing organizations to study, time and 
cost were major concerns. The organizations donated 
significant amounts of time from expensive indi-
viduals, and in some cases, real money for travel. It’s 
imperative to make a strong case for the benefits to 
the organizations of the study and to provide them 
with valuable feedback.
Diversity
In building a case study team, having diverse back-
grounds of team members is a strength. Our research 
team included several types of behavioral scientists, 
software engineering experts, and usability experts. 
Their different perspectives enriched discussions and 
strengthened the methodological approach.
Interviews
In the organizations being studied, having a single point 
of contact is helpful in setting up interviews, finding the 
right people and projects, and arranging logistics. Many 
interviews must be done remotely, so reliable technol-
ogy is essential to enable both the researchers and the 
interviewees to concentrate on the interview content. 
Be aware, though, that project demands often trump 
research demands, so to keep interviews short, repeat 
visits or follow-up questions might be needed. Finally, 
different cultures are interacting, so it’s important to 
obtain interviewees’ background information (edu-
cation, training, and experience), which can help to 
explain what’s observed.
In applying the methodology, get background 
information after the interviews, rather than before. 
Interviewees usually have limited time to spend in an 
interview, so the background information can be gath-
ered through paper and electronic means after the fact. 
In addition, interviewees were more interested in shar-
ing their background after they met with the research 
team and had a positive interaction that built trust.
Piloting
As we noted earlier, piloting is extremely important, 
even if only to use the methodology to learn how it 
works, what works, and what doesn’t work well. The 
pilot study in this project led to numerous significant 
improvements in the interview questions.
Focus
It’s important to be clear from the start that the study 
relates to only one security product; gathering data on 
more than one product can introduce too many variables.
Other Considerations
A review of the findings also suggests that other vari-
ables, such as team size and organizational culture, 
should be identified and used to scope out where addi-
tional case studies should be done. Barbara Kitchenham 
and her colleagues point out that case studies sample 
from the variables (rather than over the variables, as 
experiments do), so additional cases are more useful 
when they increase the representativeness of the corpus 
of organizations studied.12 These additional case stud-
ies should use the same methodology, enabling more 
effective cross-case analyses. The goal is to increase 
knowledge and understanding as this corpus grows. 
Based on the findings from these three case studies, 
future case studies that could add tremendous value to 
a corpus would include smaller companies, larger devel-
opment teams, government or nonprofit organizations, 
and nonaccess control products. 
O ne valuable addition to the executed design would be formal testing to determine whether 
the resulting products improved in usability and secu-
rity. We requested the products for such testing, but 
these organizations were concerned about their intel-
lectual property and weren’t willing to hand over the 
products for independent testing. Instead, we had to 
rely on demonstrations and specifically ask “how do 
you know” questions when the organizations claimed 
improved usability. This is a good example of how a 
theoretical study design must be modified to reflect 
organizational constraints. Future case studies should 
continue to request formal testing. 
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